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Idiosyncratic tendency to choose one alternative over others in the absence of 
an identified reason, is a common observation in two-alternative forced-choice 
experiments. It is tempting to account for it as resulting from the (unknown) 
participant-specific history and thus treat it as a measurement noise. Indeed, 
idiosyncratic choice biases are typically considered as nuisance. Care is taken 
to account for them by adding an ad-hoc bias parameter or by counterbalancing 
the choices to average them out. Here we quantify idiosyncratic choice biases 
in a perceptual discrimination task and a motor task. We report substantial and 
significant biases in both cases. Then, we present theoretical evidence that even 
in idealized experiments, in which the settings are symmetric, idiosyncratic 
choice bias is expected to emerge from the dynamics of competing neuronal 
networks. We thus argue that idiosyncratic choice bias reflects the microscopic 
dynamics of choice and therefore is virtually inevitable in any comparison or 
decision task.  
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… suppose that there are two equal dates in front of someone gazing longingly at 
them, unable, however, to take both together. He will inevitably take one of them 
through an attribute whose function is to render a thing specific, [differentiating it] from 
its like. 
Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī (1058 – 1111), The Incoherence of the Philosophers, p. 231 
Decision making is the cognitive process of choosing an action among a set of 
alternatives. Decision making is often studied in experiments, composed of trials, each 
associated with a single decision. While a decision in a trial is primarily determined by 
the relevant features of the alternatives, biases are commonly observed2. Of specific 
relevance to this work are participant-specific tendencies to prefer one alternative over 
the others, which we term idiosyncratic choice bias (ICB)2. Such biases have been 
described as early as half a century ago in perceptual discrimination3–5 and operant 
learning tasks6–8.  
In discrimination tasks, ICBs interfere with the estimate of perceptual noise. In operant 
learning experiments ICBs mask the learning behavior. That is why ICBs are typically 
considered as nuisance. When analyzing choice behavior ICBs are often accounted 
for by adding an ad-hoc participant-specific bias parameter4.  
Pathological asymmetries can sometimes cause ICBs. For example, patients with 
visuospatial (or hemispatial) neglect are commonly biased in their responses towards 
stimuli located in the ipsilesional hemispace9–11. In some cases, the specific 
experimental settings can account for the observed ICBs. For example, in asymmetric 
settings, in which one alternative is more often associated than others with the correct 
answer, participants develop a bias in favor of that alternative12–15.  
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Sequential effects are also potential contributors to ICBs. In perceptual tasks, a 
stimulus in a given trial is often perceived as being more similar to the stimuli presented 
in previous trials16–18. In operant learning tasks, correlations between actions and 
reinforcers bias participants to choose those actions that were previously 
rewarded19,20. These sequential effects can be modelled using linear non-linear 
regression, in which the bias is a non-linear function of a linear combination of stimuli, 
actions and the product of actions and reinforcers21.  
One could also interpret ICBs as resulting from sequential effects occurring not during 
but prior to the experimental session22. Participants are not tabula rasa when entering 
an experimental session23. They come with their own specific history of stimuli and 
choices. These participant-specific histories can, in principle, result in idiosyncratic 
biases via long-term sequential effects.  
It is generally believed that the neural basis of decision between alternative responses 
is a competition for higher activity between populations of neurons, each representing 
a different response. The external input that each population receives is proportional 
to the relative evidence in favor of the alternative it represents (for review see 24). An 
explanation of ICBs in this framework is that they are the result of idiosyncratic 
asymmetries in the external inputs to the competing populations in the network.  
Here we present an alternative explanation. Combining experimental and theoretical 
results, we argue that substantial ICBs naturally emerge from the dynamics of 
competing neuronal networks, even in the absence of any asymmetry in their external 
inputs. According to this explanation, ICBs are expected even when participants are 
naïve with respect to the task. In fact, our work suggests that ICBs are inevitable unless 
they are actively suppressed, e.g. by the reward schedule.  
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Results 
Choice bias in a bisection discrimination task 
We quantified ICB in the bisection discrimination task depicted in Fig. 1a. In each trial, 
a vertical transected line was presented on the screen for 1 sec, and participants were 
instructed to indicate the offset direction of the transecting line (see Materials and 
Methods). The left panel of Fig. 1b depicts the probability of an ‘Up’ response as a 
function of the offset, for three participants. As expected, the probability of a correct 
response increased with the magnitude of the offset 𝛥𝐿 𝐿⁄ ≡ (𝐿௎ − 𝐿஽) (𝐿௎ + 𝐿஽)⁄ , 
where 𝐿௎ and 𝐿஽ denote the lengths of the Up and Down segments of the vertical line. 
For small offsets, however, the responses differed between the three participants: the 
blue psychometric curve is shifted to the right of the black curve, whereas the red is 
shifted to the left.  
We considered the choices of the participants in 20 “impossible” trials (1/6 of the trials), 
in which the line was transected at its midpoint (𝛥𝐿 = 0). The participant whose 
psychometric curve is plotted in black in Fig. 1b (left) did not exhibit any significant 
choice bias, responding ‘Up’ in 11/20 impossible trials, (p=0.8238, Binomial test). By 
contrast, the two other participants (red and blue in Fig. 1b, left) exhibited significant 
choice bias, responding ‘Up’ in 18/20 and 1/20 of the trials, respectively (p<0.001, 
Binomial test). Overall, 48% of the participants (n=100) exhibited a significant choice 
bias (24% significant ‘Up’, p < 0.05, Binomial test; 24% significant ‘Down’, p < 0.05, 
Binomial test). This bias was present despite the fact that we designed the 
experimental protocol to reduce biases resulting from sequential effects and operant 
learning (see Materials and Methods and Discussion). Indeed, at the population level, 
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there was no choice bias (p=0.8381, Wilcoxon signed−rank test): the fraction of ‘Up’ 
choices in the impossible trials across all participants was 0.505.  
To quantify the heterogeneity of these ICBs across the population, we computed, for 
each of the participants, the difference between the fraction of ‘Up’ and ‘Down’ 
responses in the impossible trials. The distribution of this quantity across the 
participants is depicted in Fig. 1b (right). Its variance is significantly larger than 
expected by chance (p<10-6, bootstrap, fair Bernoulli process). These results indicate 
that despite the fact that at the population level, choices in the vertical bisection task 
were unbiased, the behavior of the individual participants was biased.  
 
Figure 1 ICBs in the vertical bisection task. (a) A schematic illustration of the 
stimulus in a single trial. The participants were instructed to indicate the offset 
direction of the transecting line. (b) Left: Psychometric curves of three participants. 
Error bars denote the standard error of the mean (SEM). Curves are best-fit logistic 
functions. Right: Distribution of the choice bias measure (see Materials and 
Methods) of all participants (𝑛 = 100). The biases of the three participants in (b) are 
denoted in the histogram by arrows of corresponding colors. 
ICB in a motor task 
Next, we constructed a novel motor task, in which ICBs are unlikely to emerge from 
idiosyncratic sensory asymmetries. In each trial, two adjacent colored dots on a white 
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circular background were displayed on a computer screen (Fig. 2a, see also Fig. S1a). 
Participants were instructed to drag, as fast as possible, these dots into a central 
region indicated by a larger black disk. To ensure that the participants would make two 
temporally-separated reaching movements, we introduced a 1.1 sec delay after the 
completion of the dragging of the first colored dot (Materials and Methods). The task 
was presented to the participants as a motor-speed task, in which faster movements 
are more rewarded (see Materials and Methods). However, the behavioral parameter 
that we were interested in was the order in which participants chose to execute the 
two dragging movements. In that sense, this paradigm is a binary, implicit, decision-
making task in a setting which is symmetric with respect to the task. In this task, choice 
bias manifests as a tendency to choose to drag one of the two dots first more often 
than expected by chance. Each participant was presented with 10 different pairs of 
dots of different colors and locations. Each of these pairs was presented 20 times in a 
pseudorandom order. The ICB of a participant for a given pair of dots was defined as 
the difference between the fraction of trials, in which she chose the clock-wise dot first 
and the fraction of trials, in which she first chose the counter-clockwise dot. This 
allowed us to measure 10 different ICBs (one for each pair) for each participant.  
Figure 2b depicts the distribution of choice biases across the participants for the pair 
of dots plotted in Fig. 2a. There was no systematic choice bias at the population level 
(p=0.41, Wilcoxon signed−rank test). Nevertheless, 65% of the participants exhibited 
significant ICB for this pair (35% significant preference towards choosing the clock-
wise dot first and 30% significant preference in favor of choosing the counter-clockwise 
dot first; p < 0.05 Binomial test).  
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Considering all 10 pairs, for 8/10 of the pairs we found no consistent choice bias across 
the population (p>0.05, Wilcoxon signed−rank test, not corrected for multiple 
comparisons). These 8 pairs were considered for further analysis (see Fig. S1b for all 
pairs). For each of these, the variances of the bias distributions were larger than 
expected by chance (Fig. 2c; p>10-6, bootstrap, fair Bernoulli process), indicating that 
participants in this task exhibited significant ICBs for each of these pairs.  
It should be noted that the distributions of biases in this motor decision task was 
different from the one we found in the bisection task. Although both were broader than 
expected by chance, the distribution was narrower in the bisection task than in the 
motor task (compare Figs. 1b, right, and 2c; standard deviations are 0.55 and 0.68, 
respectively, p<10-4, Shuffling).  
 
Figure 2: Choice bias in the motor task. (a) A schematic illustration of the stimulus 
in a single trial. The participants were instructed to use the mouse to drag the two 
dots to a center circle as fast as possible. We used 10 different pairs of dots, each 
appearing 20 times (see also Fig. S1a). (b) Distribution of ICBs over all participants 
(𝑁 = 20) for the pair of dots depicted in (a). Positive (negative) bias corresponds to 
a preference towards choosing the clockwise (counterclockwise) first. (c) Right, 
Distribution of choice biases across the population for the 8 pairs of dots (Left, color-
coded) devoid of a consistent choice bias (see also Fig. S1b).  
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Choice bias and the Drift Diffusion Model  
The two experiments described in Figs. 1 and 2 demonstrate ICBs in two-alternative 
decision tasks that are symmetric, when judged by the population-average behavior. 
To understand the neural basis of these ICBs and the determinants of the shape of 
their distributions, we constructed a simplified neuronal network that models choice 
behavior in the bisection task. The network consists of two populations of neurons 
representing ‘Up’ and ‘Down’ choices, denoted by ‘U’ and ‘D’, respectively (Fig. 3a, 
left). Each population comprises 𝑁 2⁄  independent Poisson neurons, such that the 
spike train of each neuron in a trial is an independent homogeneous Poisson process. 
The firing rate of each neuron is an exponential function of the sum of offset-dependent 
and offset-independent inputs (Eq. 1 in Materials and Methods). The offset-dependent 
input is a linear function of the offset of the bisecting line 𝛥𝐿 (Fig. 3a, bottom; see 
Materials and methods), such that the firing rates of the U neurons increase with 𝛥𝐿, 
whereas that of the D neurons decrease with 𝛥𝐿 (Fig. 3a, right). A negative offset (𝛥𝐿 <
0) decreases the firing rate of the U neurons and increases that of the D neurons. The 
offset-independent input models the heterogeneity between the neurons by assuming 
that each neuron receives an additional input, different for each neuron and drawn 
from a normal distribution, constant over time and between trials. As a result, the firing 
rates of the neurons are drawn from log-normal distributions (as is observed in the 
cortex25,26), whose parameters depend on the offset (orange and pink distributions in 
Fig. 3a). In the absence of an offset (𝛥𝐿 = 0), the firing rate distributions of the two 
populations are the same (blue distribution in Fig. 3a, right).  
Decision in our model depends on the cumulative number of spikes, 𝑛௎(𝑡) and 𝑛஽(𝑡), 
emitted by populations U and D up to time 𝑡 in a trial. A decision is made at time 𝑡∗, at 
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which the absolute value of the difference in the numbers of spikes, |𝛥𝑛(𝑡∗)| =
|𝑛௎(𝑡) − 𝑛஽(𝑡)|, reaches a given threshold, 𝜃, for the first time. The decision is ‘Up’ if 
𝛥𝑛(𝑡∗) = 𝜃, whereas it is ‘Down’ if 𝛥𝑛(𝑡∗) = −𝜃 (Fig. 3b).  
 
Figure 3: The DDM. (a) Schematic illustration of the network. It consists of 2 large 
populations of independent Poisson neurons (Center), receiving stimulus-selective 
input (Bottom, direction of triangle denotes selectivity to 𝛥𝐿) and emitting spikes 
which are accumulated (Top). Right, the stimulus-dependent distribution of firing 
rates. In the absence of offset (𝛥𝐿 = 0), the rate of ‘U’ and ‘D’ neurons are drawn 
from the same distribution (blue curve). When the upper segment of the line is longer 
(𝛥𝐿 > 0), neurons in population ‘U’ increase their firing rates (pink curve), whereas 
neurons in population ‘D’ decrease their firing rates (orange curve). Note that the 
lognormal distribution of rates is equivalent to normal distribution of log-rates. (b) 
Example trial. The absolute value of the difference in spikes counts is accumulated 
over time, until the threshold is reached. The decision corresponds to the ‘winning’ 
population, here ‘D’. 
Our model is a microscopic version of the pure Drift Diffusion Model of decision making 
(DDM) in the free-response paradigm24,27–34. In the DDM, noisy evidence in favor of 
each of the alternatives is accumulated throughout the trial and its difference is 
represented by a dynamic variable. A decision is made when the absolute value of this 
variable reaches a predefined threshold and the identity of the decision is determined 
by the sign of this variable at the time of the decision. In our model, the accumulated 
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evidence in favor of an alternative is the number of spikes emitted by the 
corresponding population of neurons. 
The psychometric curve of an example network is depicted in Fig. 4a (left; black). 
Because of the dependence of the firing rate distributions on 𝛥𝐿, the larger 𝛥𝐿, the 
more likely it is that the network would choose 'Up'. However, the outcome of this 
decision process is not deterministic. Because of the Poisson nature of the spiking, 
𝛥𝑛(𝑡) occasionally reaches the threshold that is incongruent with the stimulus, 
resulting in an error. More generally, because the firing of the neurons is stochastic, 
the psychometric curve is a smooth sigmoidal function of 𝛥𝐿 rather than a step 
function. Note that in the black psychometric curve of Fig. 4a, the network’s perceptual 
decision in the “impossible trials” (𝛥𝐿 = 0) is approximately at chance level. Thus, this 
particular network does not exhibit a substantial choice bias. 
The black psychometric curve in Fig. 4a (left) was obtained for a particular realization 
of the network. The red and blue lines in Fig. 4a (left) depict the psychometric curves 
of two other realizations. Despite the fact that the three networks were constructed in 
the same way, i.e., by randomly drawing the firing rates of the neurons from the same 
distributions, the red psychometric curve is shifted to the left whereas the blue is shifted 
to the right, relative to the black one. Thus, in contrast to the "black" network, the "red" 
and "blue" networks exhibit ICBs in favor and against responding ‘Up’. We 
mathematically derived the distribution of ICBs in the DDM and its dependence on the 
model parameters (see Materials and Methods). This is depicted in Fig. 4a, center. 
These results demonstrate that a wide distribution of ICBs naturally emerges in a 
symmetric setting in this standard decision model.  
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Observing a wide distribution of ICBs in networks comprising of a small number of 
neurons is easy to understand. Let us consider a model composed of only two Poisson 
neurons (Eq. 1 in Materials and Methods), one representing choice ‘Up’ and the other 
representing choice ‘Down’. Even in the impossible trials in which the firing rates of the 
two neurons are independently drawn from the same lognormal distribution, the actual 
firing rates of the two neurons will, in general, differ. In some realizations the firing rate 
of the U neuron will be higher than that of the D neuron, whereas in others, it will be 
lower. Choice, determined by the first threshold reaching of the accumulated difference 
in the number of spikes fired by the neurons, will more often be congruent with the 
neuron whose firing rate is higher. However, because the firing of spikes in the model 
is a Poisson random process, in some trials decision will be incongruent with the 
difference in the firing rates. In summary, in this two-neuron network, ICB is the result 
of the interplay between the Poisson noise and the heterogeneity in the (two) firing 
rates. The former decreases the bias, whereas the latter increases it.  
Emergence of ICB is thus expected in small decision-making networks. However, it is 
not immediately clear why biases are also observed in our DDM model, which involves 
a large number of neurons. In our simulations, the difference between the population 
averaged firing rates of the U and D neurons is vanishingly small. This is because in 
large networks, this difference is of the order of 1 √𝑁⁄ , where 𝑁 is the number of 
neurons, and thus goes to zero when 𝑁 is large (as in Fig. 3, 𝑁 = 200,000). Thus, one 
may expect that in our DDM model, this heterogeneity in firing rates should not play a 
significant role in the decision process. One should note, however, that the sensitivity 
of the decision-making network to the difference in the average firing rates increases 
in proportion to √𝑁. This is because the trial-to-trial Poisson-driven fluctuations 
decrease with the number of the neurons 𝑁. This increases the sensitivity of the choice 
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process to small heterogeneities in the firing rates and by that, results in substantial 
ICBs even in large networks. As a matter of fact in the limit of infinite 𝑁, the distribution 
of ICBs remains broad and becomes independent of 𝑁 (Materials and Methods).  
Unlike network size, the decision threshold has a large effect on the magnitude of 
choice bias. This is depicted in Figs. 4a-c, where the psychometric curves of three 
networks, only differing in the value of the decision threshold, are plotted (left). The 
larger the threshold, the steeper is the psychometric curve. This is because the time it 
takes the network to reach a decision increases with the threshold (Compare right 
panels in Figs. 4a-c). Thus, a larger threshold results in the integration of spikes over 
longer durations before a decision is made. Therefore, decision outcomes are less 
sensitive to the Poisson noise. On the other hand, network heterogeneity is 
independent of decision time. Because the magnitude of the choice bias is determined 
by the interplay of the Poisson noise and networks heterogeneity, the larger the 
threshold is, the broader will be the distribution of ICBs (Figs. 4a, 4b and 4c, Center).  
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Figure 4: ICBs in the DDM. The psychometric curves (Left), ICB distribution (Center) 
and distribution of decision times (Right) for intermediate (a), high (b) and low (c) 
thresholds, (See: Materials and Methods), where θ∗ = 291. Left: Psychometric 
curves depicting 3 different networks (Eq. 2 in Materials and Methods). Center: ICB 
distribution (Eq. 3 in Materials and Methods). Right: Distribution of decision times; 
(Eq. 4 in Materials and Methods). 
Choice bias in a recurrent spiking network  
In our DDM, both the Poisson firing of the neurons and the heterogeneity in their firing 
rates, the ingredients of our mechanism for the ICB, were introduced ad hoc. 
Therefore, we investigated whether the results derived in the latter framework also 
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hold for more realistic recurrent spiking network models of decision making, in which 
noise and heterogeneity emerge from the non-linear collective dynamics of the 
network.  
The model we studied comprises of 32,000 excitatory and 8,000 inhibitory Leaky 
Integrate and Fire (LIF) neurons (Fig. 5a; see Materials and Methods for details). All 
neurons receive a feedforward input, which is selective to the stimulus. For half of the 
neurons (U neurons), this input linearly increases with 𝛥𝐿, whereas for the other half, 
(D neurons), it is a decreasing function of 𝛥𝐿. When the two segments are of equal 
length (impossible trials), the U and D neurons receive the same stimulus-dependent 
feedforward input. All neurons are recurrently connected in a random and non-specific 
manner, i.e. independent of the selectivity properties of the pre and postsynaptic 
neurons. The competition between the U and the D neurons is mediated by an 
additional set of connections, which are functionally specific, less numerous but 
stronger than the unspecific ones. We investigated the dynamics of this model by 
performing numerical simulations (See Materials and Methods).  
Because of the strong recurrent connections, the network operates in the balanced 
regime35, in which strong inhibition compensates for the strong excitation. The activity 
of the neurons in the network, in the absence of stimulus-related input (spontaneous 
activity), exhibits Poisson-like temporal variability of spike timing (Fig. 5b). Firing rates 
are heterogeneous across neurons and are approximately log-normally distributed36 
(Fig. 5c) as also observed in the cortex25,26. 
Before a stimulus is presented, the population average firing rates of the U and D 
neurons are similar (Fig. 5d). In response to the stimulus (𝑡 = 0), the neurons increase 
their firing rates. Because of the competition induced by the specific inhibitory 
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connectivity between these populations, the time courses of the activities of the U and 
the D neurons are different. The decision process in this model is determined by the 
relative difference in the average firing rates of the excitatory neurons of the U and the 
D populations. The decision is made when this difference is larger than a fixed 
threshold, in congruence with the more active population (Fig. 5d; see also Materials 
and Methods).  
 
Figure 5: Spiking network model. (a) Schematic illustration of the network 
architecture. The network (top) consists of recurrently connected excitatory (red) and 
inhibitory (blue) LIF neurons receiving stimulus-selective feed-forward input (bottom, 
direction of triangle indicates the selectivity). (b) Spontaneous activity of example 
excitatory (red) and inhibitory (blue) neurons in the network. (c) Distribution of the 
spontaneous firing rates of the 32,000 excitatory neurons in the network. (d) Raster 
plot (10% of the neurons, top) and average firing rates (bottom) of the excitatory U 
(purple) and D (green) neurons, in response to a stimulus (gray region). The decision 
is made when the relative difference between the firing rates of the two populations 
crosses the threshold (after which the feed-forward input ceases). 
Fig. 6a (left, black) plots the psychometric curve of the network depicted in Fig. 5. 
When the magnitude of 𝛥𝐿 is large, the perceptual decision of the network is almost 
always correct; as 𝛥𝐿 decreases, the error rate increases. Considering the “impossible 
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trials” (𝛥𝐿 = 0), in which the two segments are of equal length, the network’s 
perceptual decision is approximately at chance level. However, a different realization 
of the connectivity matrix will result in a different psychometric curve. The red and blue 
curves in Fig. 6a, left, depict the behavior of two additional networks, each 
corresponding to a different realization of the connectivity matrix. In contrast to the 
"black" network, the "red" and "blue" networks exhibit substantial choice bias.   
To estimate the distribution of ICBs in our recurrent network model, we simulated 200 
networks, which only differed in their realizations of the connectivity matrix. We 
computed the ICB of each network from choice in 500 “impossible” trials. The central 
panel in Fig. 6a, center, depicts the distribution of these ICBs across the 200 networks. 
It is significantly wider than expected by chance (p<10-6, bootstrap, fair Bernoulli 
process).  
In the DDM, the value of the threshold controls the shape of the distribution of biases 
because it affects the average decision time. We studied the determinants of the shape 
of the bias distribution in our recurrent network model. Simulations revealed that this 
shape depends on the strength of the selective inhibitory synapses 𝑔 (Materials and 
Methods section). This is because 𝑔 strongly modulates average decision time. As 
depicted in Fig. 6b, decreasing 𝑔 slows down decision (compare Fig. 6b, right to Fig. 
6a, right) and results in steeper psychometric curves (compare Fig. 6b, left and Fig. 
6a, left) and a wider, more convex, distribution of ICBs (compare Fig. 6b, center and 
Fig. 6a, center). Similarly, increasing 𝑔, results in faster decision, shallower 
psychometric curves and a more concave distribution of ICBs (Fig. 6c). 
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Figure 6: Choice bias in the recurrent network model. (a-c). Left: Psychometric 
curves for 3 different realizations of network connectivity. Each point is an average 
over 500 trials. Error bars correspond to SEM. Center: Distribution of ICBs for 200 
networks. Arrows correspond to specific example networks of the psychometric 
curves (color coded). Right: Distribution of decision times. The strength of the 
selective inhibition is (a) 𝑔 = 3; (b) 𝑔 = 2.7; (c) 𝑔 = 3.4. 
Discussion 
We experimentally investigated human choice bias in a discrimination task and a motor 
task. While in both tasks there was no significant bias in favor of one of the responses 
at the population level, individual participants exhibited a preference towards one of 
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the responses (ICBs). We also investigated two computational models of decision 
making, one based on the DDM and the other on a recurrent network of LIF spiking 
neurons. Both models exhibit broad distributions of ICBs across statistically-identical 
networks. The shape of these distributions reflects the interplay between fast noise 
and heterogeneities in the fine structure of the network. Our theoretical results show 
that ICBs can emerge naturally from the dynamics of decision making neural circuits.  
The temporal-scale of stochasticity  
In the two models that we have investigated, ICBs emerge from the interplay of two 
sources of stochasticity: (1) Heterogeneity in the neuronal firing rates; (2) Stochasticity 
in the timing of action potentials. The first source of stochasticity is the same in all trials 
and therefore, we refer to it as frozen or quenched noise. By contrast, stochasticity in 
the timing of action potentials differs between trials and therefore we refer to it as fast 
noise. In the DDM, both types of stochasticity are explicitly introduced ad hoc. In the 
recurrent spiking model, they emerge from the randomness of connectivity and the 
collective dynamics of the network. 
Stochastic processes in cortical networks occur at multiple time-scales37. Incorporating 
additional time-scales to the models will not qualitatively affect the results, as long as 
the contributions of these additional sources of stochasticity are on the order of 1 √𝑁⁄  
(where 𝑁 is the size of the network). To identify stochasticity at minutes’ time-scale, 
we tested whether ICBs change during the experiment. We found, for both tasks, that 
the ICBs of each participant in the first and second halves of the task were not 
significantly different (permutation test identified significant, 𝑝 < 0.05, differences in 
14/260 of the pairs, consistent with the null hypothesis), suggesting a limited 
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contribution to ICBs of stochasticity dynamics at these time-scales. It will be interesting 
to quantify the dynamics of ICBs over longer time-scales.   
The effect of correlations 
In the DDM, spikes are spatially and temporally uncorrelated. As a result, for 
sufficiently large networks, the magnitudes of both fast and quenched sources of 
stochasticity decrease as 1 √𝑁⁄  when 𝑁 is sufficiently large. Their ratio and hence the 
distribution of ICBs become independent of 𝑁 for sufficiently large networks. The two 
sources of stochasticity also satisfy these scalings in the recurrent spiking model. This 
is because the network operates in the balanced regime35,38. Noise correlations in the 
spike count of the neurons are therefore very weak39–41 and the firing rates are widely 
distributed and are spatially uncorrelated36.   
In case of correlations40,41, either in the connectivity or in the neuronal activity, spatial 
heterogeneity and temporal fluctuations decrease inversely proportional to the square 
root of the effective number of independent degrees of freedom. If the effective 
numbers of degrees of freedom are very different for the quenched and fast noises, 
one source of stochasticity would dominate, resulting in deterministic or unbiased 
choices, in contrast to our experimental observations.  
Interpretation of the ICBs observed in our experiments 
Current understanding of the neural mechanisms and computational principles 
underlying decision-making is based on experiments, in which one manipulates choice 
preferences of the participants. For example, in operant learning tasks, one 
investigates how past experience biases choices in favor or against actions that were 
closely followed by rewards or costs42–44. In perceptual tasks, one often studies how 
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specific histories of stimuli bias perceptual decisions17,45. Along these lines, it is natural 
to attribute ICBs to the specific histories of the participants during the experiment. To 
suppress these effects in the bisection task, vertical impossible trials were always 
preceded by three horizontal bisection trials. In the motor task, trials were randomized 
to reduce these effects. To minimize operant learning effects in the bisection task, only 
delayed and partial feedback was provided. In the motor task we found that dragging 
time (the feedback) was not substantially different between the first and second motor 
actions (mean dragging times are 797 ± 18ms and 814 ± 17ms, respectively; 𝑝 >
0.05, permutation test per participant, not corrected for multiple comparisons) 
suggesting that feedback played no major role in participants' choices. Combining our 
experimental results with our modeling work led us to hypothesize that the ICBs we 
observed are the consequence of random inevitable differences in the fine structure 
of connectivity in brain areas involved in the decision making process.  
Alternative interpretations and experimental predictions 
In spite of our experimental designs, we cannot exclude the possibility that ICBs that 
we have observed are the result of sequential or operant effects that we failed to 
suppress. In particular, ICBs could be the result of such processes which occurred 
before the experiment. For example, considering the impossible trials in our bisection 
task, participants may prefer to press the Down key because they are accustomed to 
pressing taskbar icons that are located at the bottom of their computer monitor. Other 
participants may prefer the Up key because they are used to a taskbar located at the 
top of the screen. In such a view, ICBs in the vertical bisection task can be attributed 
to idiosyncratic histories of computer usage prior to the experiment. 
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Such sequential effects, when analyzed using the DDM, have been interpreted as a 
manifestation of unbalanced initial conditions, with little effect on the diffusion 
processes (46–48, but see49). This interpretation is qualitatively different from the one 
we propose in the present work. In our theoretical models, microscopic heterogeneities 
in the firing rates (in our DDM) or the connectivity (in our recurrent network model) 
result in asymmetries in the drift rates.  
These two possible interpretations lead to qualitatively different experimental 
predictions regarding the dependence of the bias on decision threshold. If the bias is 
due to asymmetric initial conditions, the DDM predicts that increasing the threshold 
would reduce the bias. This is because the relative difference in the distance of the 
starting point to the two thresholds, corresponding to the two alternatives, would 
decrease. By contrast, if the bias is due to asymmetries in the drift rates, increasing 
the threshold would increase the bias, because a longer integration time allows for the 
averaging out of the fast noise. Thus, it is in principle possible to experimentally test 
our hypothesis by investigating how decision time is correlated with the magnitude of 
ICBs.  
There are several pitfalls, however, that should be avoided when investigating such a 
correlation. First, relating decision times and the distribution of biases in different tasks 
can be misleading. This is because different tasks may involve different brain areas, 
in which the levels of fast noise and spatial heterogeneities may differ. Second, 
comparing the biases of participants with different average decision time performing 
the same task can also be misleading. This is because differences in average decision 
time can be due to differences in decision thresholds, but can also be due to different 
manifestation of the quenched noise. In the former case, average decision time is 
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predicted to be positively correlated with the magnitude of bias. In the latter it would 
be anti-correlated, the result of the fact that a larger drift in the model is associated 
with a faster approach to the decision threshold. We intend to develop in future work 
an experimental paradigm, applicable to a large number of participants, which will 
allow us to precisely manipulate decision-time in the same task and in the same 
participant. 
Symmetry and asymmetry in decision tasks 
Both the discrimination and motor tasks that we considered were conceived in an 
attempt to study symmetric choices. However obviously, completely symmetric tasks 
exist only in gedanken experiments, in which the asymmetry of the task is vanishingly 
small1. In real experiments, any two-alternative choice task is inherently asymmetric. 
At the input level, the two alternatives must sufficiently differ in order to indicate the 
two possible decisions. At the output level, the two motor actions must differ in order 
to indicate which decision was made by the participant. These inevitable asymmetries 
make it impossible to rule out the possibility that ICBs are the result of the interaction 
of idiosyncratic history of the participant with such irreducible asymmetry in the 
alternative choices or the motor actions used to indicate them.  
We argue, however, that even in the ideal limit, in which the task becomes completely 
symmetric, substantial ICBs remains. In fact, because heterogeneity in firing rates and 
irregular spike timing are hallmarks of the dynamics of cortical networks26,50, we argue 
that the occurrence of an ICB in a cortical-based decision task is almost inevitable. It 
would therefore be surprising to find a decision task that is devoid of the ICB, unless 
biases are penalized in the experiment.  
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Materials and Methods 
The perceptual discrimination task 
The study was approved by the Hebrew University Committee for the Use of Human 
Subjects in Research. Data were collected from 100 participants (51 males, 49 
females; 91 dextrals, 7 sinistral, 2 ambidextrous; mean age = 39 years, max = 71 
years, min = 22 years). Recruitment was based on the online labor market Amazon 
Mechanical Turk51, all of whom are Mechanical Turk’s Masters, located in the United 
States of America. All participants reported normal or corrected to normal vision and 
no history of neurological disorders. The experiment was described as an academic 
survey of visual acuity. A base monetary compensation was given to all applied 
participants for the participation, and additional bonus fee was given according to 
performance.  
Procedure 
Participants were instructed to indicate the offset direction of the transecting line, out 
of two alternative responses. Possible responses were either ‘left’ or ‘right’, for the 
horizontal discrimination task, or ‘up’ or ‘down’, for the vertical discrimination task. 
Participants were asked to answer as quickly and accurately as possible.  
In each trial, a 200 pixels-long white line, transected by a perpendicular 20 pixels-long 
white line was presented on a black screen (Fig. 1a). The stimuli were limited to a 400 
pixels X 400 pixels square at the center of the screen and window resolution was 
verified for each participant individually so that it did not exceed the centric box in 
which all stimuli were presented. The horizontal location of all vertical bisection lines 
and the vertical location of all horizontal bisection lines were centered. After 1 sec, the 
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stimulus was replaced by a decision screen, composed of two arrows, appearing in 
opposite sides of the screen, and a middle, 4-squares submit button. The participants 
indicated their decision by moving the initially centered cursor to one of the arrows, 
pressing it, and finalizing their decision by pressing the ‘submit’ button. No feedback 
was given regarding the correct response; however, the participants were informed 
about the accumulated bonus fee up to this trial every 30 trials. 
The experiment consisted of 240 transected-line trials, 120 horizontal and 120 vertical. 
Trials were ordered in 80 alternating blocks of 3 horizontal and 3 vertical transected 
lines. Unbeknown to the participants, there were 20 impossible horizontal and 20 
impossible vertical trials (⅙ of the trials). To control for sequential effects, all 
impossible trials were preceded by trials of the opposite task. The order of the trials 
was pseudorandom but identical for all participants. For the non-impossible trials, the 
deviation from the veridical midpoint was uniformly distributed between 5 and 10 
pixels, with an equal number of offsets in each direction. To quantify the ICB, we 
focused on the vertical bisection trials because it is well established that in the 
horizontal bisection task, participants exhibit a global bias, which has been attributed 
to pseudoneglect52. 
The motor task 
The study was approved by the Hebrew University Committee for the Use of Human 
Subjects in Research. Data were collected from 20 participants (13 males, 7 females; 
all dextrals; mean age = 25 years, max = 41 years, min = 19 years), who were recruited 
using on-campus advertising. All participants reported normal or corrected to normal 
vision and no history of neurological disorders. A base monetary compensation was 
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given to all participants, and additional bonus fee was given according to performance 
(speed of moving the dots).  
Procedure  
In each trial, a pair of dots, equally distant from a central black disk, were presented 
on a background of a larger white disk, as depicted in Figs. 2a and S1a. Participants 
were instructed to drag the two dots into the black disk using the mouse cursor as 
quickly as possible. Each trial started with a forced delay period of 0.75 seconds. Then, 
the mouse cursor appeared in the center of the disc. The participant used the mouse 
to move the cursor to one of the dots. Then, she dragged the chosen dot to the central 
black disk by pressing the mouse and moving it. If accurate, a release of the dot on 
the central black disk resulted in a 1.1 sec “swallowing” of the dot animation, indicating 
a successful drag. The dragging time appeared on the screen (from the time of clicking 
on the dot to the time of its release) and after the forced delay, it disappeared and the 
cursor reappeared in the center of the disk. The participant processed the second dot 
as for the first dot. We used 10 different pairs of dots, each presented 20 times. Each 
pair of dots was of equal distance from the center of the black disk, but of a different 
color and a different angular location (Fig. S1b). The order of presentation was 
pseudorandom such that in every consecutive group of 10 trials all pairs appeared. 
Participants received a show-up monetary compensation of 20 NIS and received a 
bonus reward depending on the average dragging duration: 1 NIS for every 50 msec 
below 1 sec.    
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The Drift Diffusion model  
We consider two populations of neurons, denoted by ‘U’ and ‘D’, representing choice 
‘Up’ and ‘Down’ (Fig. 3a). Each population is composed of 𝑁 2⁄  independent Poisson 
neurons. The stimulus-dependent feedforward inputs to neuron 𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ ቄ1, … , ே
ଶ
ቅ) in 
population 𝛼 (𝛼 ∈ {𝑈, 𝐷}) is given by: 𝜇௜ఈ ቀ
௱௅
௅
ቁ = 𝑘ఈ ⋅ ௱௅
௅
+ 𝑧௜ఈ, where 𝑘௎ = −𝑘஽ = 𝑘 is a 
parameter. The heterogeneity between the neurons due to recurrent input is modelled 
𝑧௜ఈ, which is independently drawn from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with 
variance 𝜎ଶ, 〈𝑧௜ఈ〉 = 0, 〈(𝑧௜ఈ)ଶ〉 = 𝜎ଶ. The firing rate 𝜈௜ఈ of neuron 𝑖 in population 𝛼 is 
given by 
 𝜈௜ఈ = ?̅? ⋅ 𝑒
ఊ⋅ఓ೔
ഀቀ೩ಽಽ ቁ (1) 
where ?̅? is a baseline firing rate and 𝛾 is the gain36. Note that due to the exponential 
transfer function and the normal distribution of inputs, the firing rates are log-normally 
distributed, as reported in the cortex25,26. The dynamics of choice follows DDM, as 
described in the text27. In particular, a decision is made when |𝛥𝑛|, reaches for the first 
time a given threshold, 𝜃 = √𝑁 ∙  𝜃෨, where 𝜃෨ is a parameter of the model, which is 𝑂(1). 
For 𝑁 ≫ 1, neglecting the threshold effect, the difference in spike count is given by 
𝛥𝑛(𝑡)~𝒩(𝛥𝜈 ∙ 𝑡, Σ𝜈 ∙ 𝑡), where 𝛥𝜈 = ∑ 𝜈௜௎ −௜ ∑ 𝜈௜஽௜  and Σ𝜈 = ∑ 𝜈௜௎ +௜ ∑ 𝜈௜஽௜ . For 𝑁 ≫ 1, 
both 𝛥𝜈 and Σ𝜈 are normally distributed: 
𝛥𝜈~𝒩 ൭𝑁?̅?𝑒
ംమ഑మ
మ sinh ቀ𝛾𝑘 ௱௅
௅
ቁ , 𝑁?̅?ଶ൫𝑒ఊమఙమ − 1൯𝑒ఊమఙమcosh ቀ2𝛾𝑘 ௱௅
௅
ቁ൱  
Σ𝜈~𝒩 ൭𝑁?̅?𝑒
ംమ഑మ
మ cosh ቀ𝛾𝑘 ௱௅
௅
ቁ , 𝑁?̅?ଶ൫𝑒ఊమఙమ − 1൯𝑒ఊమఙమcosh ቀ2𝛾𝑘 ௱௅
௅
ቁ൱.   
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Note that 𝛥𝑛 and 𝛥𝜈 correspond to different stochastic processes: the stochasticity of 
𝛥𝑛 stems from trial-by-trial variability, conditioned on the firing rates of the neurons. By 
contrast, the stochasticity of 𝛥𝜈 reflects heterogeneity in these firings rates across 
different realizations of decision-making networks.  
The standard deviation of the distribution of Σ𝜈 is of 𝑂൫√𝑁൯, whereas its mean is 𝑂(𝑁) 
even when 𝛥𝐿 → 0. Therefore, in the limit 𝑁 ≫ 1, Σ𝜈 ≈ 𝑁?̅?𝑒
ംమ഑మ
మ cosh ቀ𝛾𝑘 ௱௅
௅
ቁ. By 
contrast, in the regime in which ቚ௱௅
௅
ቚ = 𝑂൫1 √𝑁⁄ ൯, the mean and standard deviations of 
the distribution of 𝛥𝜈 are comparable, both are 𝑂൫√𝑁൯.  
The probability of an ‘Up’ decision is obtained by solving a first-passage problem:  
𝑝 ≡ Pr(′Up′) = ቀ1 + eିଶ௱ఔ√ே∙ఏ෩ ஊఔ⁄ ቁ
ିଵ
= ൮1 + e
ିଶ೩ഌ
√ಿ
∙ ഇ
෩
ഌഥ∙ౙ౥౩౞ቀംೖ೩ಽಽ ቁ∙೐
ംమ഑మ
మ
തതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതതത
൲
ିଵ
  (2)  
The psychometric curve is obtained by substituting the dependence of 𝛥𝜈 on 𝛥𝐿. 
Specifically, when the two networks are symmetric, 𝛥𝜈 = 𝑁?̅?𝑒
ംమ഑మ
మ sinh ቀ𝛾𝑘 ௱௅
௅
ቁ,  yielding: 
𝑝 = ൬1 + eିଶ√ே∙ఏ
෩୲ୟ୬୦ቀఊ௞೩ಽಽ ቁ൰
ିଵ
≈ ቀ1 + eିଶ√ே∙ఏ∙෩ ఊ௞∙
೩ಽ
ಽ ቁ
ିଵ
  
More generally, when the two networks are only drawn from the same distribution, the 
resultant psychometric curve will be horizontally shifted relative to the identical 
networks case.  
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To compute the distribution of choice biases, we consider the case in which the 
external input is symmetric, 𝛥𝐿 = 0 and thus 𝛥𝜈~𝒩൫0, 𝑁?̅?ଶ൫𝑒ఊమఙమ − 1൯ ∙ 𝑒ఊమఙమ൯. Using 
the change-of-variable technique,  
Pr(𝑝) = ଵ
௣∙(ଵି௣)
∙ ଵ
ට଼గቀ௘ംమ഑మିଵቁ∙ఏ෩
𝑒
ି൫ౢ౥ౝ
(೛)షౢ౥ౝ(భష೛)൯
మ
ఴቀ೐ംమ഑మషభቁഇ෩మ  (3) 
Choice bias in this framework is given by 2𝑝 − 1.      
The corresponding distribution of decision times is computed by averaging the drift-
conditioned distribution of first-passage times over the distribution of 𝛥𝜈, yielding28,53,54: 
𝑓(𝑡) = గ
ଶఏమ
?̅?𝑒
ംమ഑మ
మ
ଵ
ටଵା௧ఔഥ௘
ംమ഑మ
మ (௘ംమ഑మିଵ)
exp ቌଵ
ଶ
ఏ෩మ
௧ఔഥ௘
ംమ഑మ
మ ା భ
(೐ംమ഑మషభ)
ቍ   
 × ∑ 𝑘 sin ቀగ௞
ଶ
ቁ exp ൬−𝑡 ௞
మగమ
଼
ఔഥ
ఏ෩మ
𝑒
ംమ഑మ
మ ൰ஶ௞ୀଵ  (4) 
The spiking network model 
The model consists of a recurrent network of 𝑁 leaky-integrate-and-fire (LIF) neurons, 
𝑁ா = 0.8𝑁 excitatory and 𝑁ூ = 0.2𝑁 inhibitory (the superscript notation here denotes 
neuron type, excitatory or inhibitory, rather than the selectivity of the neuron).  
Single neuron dynamics: The sub-threshold dynamics of the membrane potential, 
𝑉௜ఈ(𝑡), of neuron 𝑖 in population 𝛼 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁ఈ;  𝛼 = 𝐸, 𝐼) follow: 
𝜏௠
𝑑𝑉௜ఈ(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 = −(𝑉௜ఈ(𝑡) − 𝑉௅ ) + 𝐼௥௘௖,௜ఈ (𝑡) + 𝐼ிி,௜ఈ (𝑡) + 𝐼௕ఈ   
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where 𝜏௠ is the neuron membrane time constant, 𝑉௅ is the reversal potential of the leak 
current. Inputs to the neuron are modeled as currents: 𝐼௥௘௖,௜ఈ (𝑡) is the recurrent input 
into neuron (𝑖, 𝛼), due to its interactions with other neurons in the network, 𝐼ிி,௜ఈ (𝑡) is 
the feedforward input into that neuron elicited upon presentation of the stimulus, and 
𝐼௕ఈ is a background feedforward input, independent of the stimulus, identical for all the 
neurons and constant in time. These subthreshold dynamics are supplemented by a 
reset condition: if at 𝑡 = 𝑡௜ఈ  the membrane potential of neuron (𝑖, 𝛼) reaches the 
threshold, 𝑉௜ఈ(𝑡௜ఈି) = 𝑉 , the neuron fires an action potential and its voltage resets to 
𝑉௜ఈ(𝑡௜ఈା) = 𝑉ோ. 
The feedforward input:  The network consists of two types of neurons, U-selective and 
D-selective. In the absence of stimulus, the feedforward input 𝐼ிி,௜ఈ (𝑡) = 0 for all the 
neurons. Upon presentation of a stimulus 𝐼ிி,௜ఈ (𝑡) to U-selective neurons is stronger 
when the upper segment is larger than the lower one. It is the opposite for the D-
selective neurons. Specifically, we take: 
𝐼ிி,௜ఈ (𝑡) = 𝐼଴ఈ + 𝜀 
∆𝐿
𝐿
𝐼ଵఈ   
where 𝐿 is the length of the line, ∆𝐿 is the difference between the length of the upper 
segment and the lower segment, 𝐼଴ఈ and 𝐼ଵఈ are positive constants and 𝜀 denotes the 
selectivity type of the neuron: 𝜀 = +1  for U neurons and  𝜀 = −1 for D neurons. Thus, 
the U (D) neurons are selective to stimulus in which the upper segment is longer 
(shorter) than the lower segment. We denote the set of U-selective (D-selective) 
neurons in population 𝛼 = 𝐸, 𝐼 by 𝑈஑ (𝐷஑).  Neuron (𝑖, 𝛼) ∈ 𝑈஑  when 𝑖 = 1 … ே
ಉ 
ଶ
 and t 
(𝑖, 𝛼) ∈ 𝐷஑ when 𝑖 = ே
ಉ 
ଶ
+ 1 … 𝑁஑.  
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The recurrent input: The connectivity matrix is composed of two components: the non-
specific (independent of the selectivity of the pre and postsynaptic neurons) 
component is fully random (Erdös-Renyi graph). The corresponding 𝑁ఈ × 𝑁ఉ  
connectivity matrix, 𝐂ேௌ
 ఈఉ, is such that 𝐶ேௌ,௜௝
 ఈఉ = 1 with probability 𝐾/𝑁ఉ and 𝐶ேௌ,௜௝
 ఈఉ = 0 
otherwise, where 𝐾 is the average number of non-specific inputs that a neuron 
receives from neurons in population 𝛽. The strength of the non-specific connections 
depends solely on 𝛼, 𝛽 yielding: 𝐽ேௌ,௜௝
 ఈఉ = 𝐽ேௌ
 ఈఉ𝐶ேௌ,௜௝
 ఈఉ  where 𝐽ேௌ ఈா>0 (excitation) and 𝐽ேௌ ఈூ<0 
(inhibition).  
The competition between the U and the D selective neurons is mediated by an 
additional set of connections, which are specific. These connections are much less 
numerous but stronger than the unspecific ones. The corresponding connectivity 
matrices, 𝐂ௌ,௜௝
 ఈఉ, are such that: 
1) 𝐶ௌ,௜௝ ఈா = 0  i.e. we assume no specific excitation. 
2) 𝐶ௌ,௜௝ ఈூ = 0 if 𝑖 and 𝑗 have the same selectivity properties. 
3) 𝐶ௌ,௜௝ ఈூ = 1 with probability 2√𝐾/𝑁ூ if 𝑖 and 𝑗 have different selectivity properties. 
Therefore, each neuron receives, on average, √𝐾 connections from inhibitory neurons 
whose selectivity is different from its own (compared with, on average, 𝐾 non-selective 
inhibitory connections).  
The strength of the specific connections depends solely on the neurons’ type 𝐽ௌ,௜௝ ఈூ =
𝐽ௌ ఈூ𝐶ௌ,௜௝ ఈூ ; 𝑔 = 𝐽ௌ ఈூ 𝐽ேௌ ఈூ⁄ .  
The total current into neuron (𝑖, 𝛼) due to the recurrent interactions is: 
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𝐼௥௘௖,௜ఈ (𝑡) = ෍ቀ𝐽ௌ,௜௝
 ఈఉ + 𝐽ேௌ,௜௝
 ఈఉ ቁ𝑆௝
ఈఉ(𝑡)
௝,ఉ
 
where 𝑆௜
ఈఉ(𝑡) are synaptic variables, which follow the dynamics: 
𝜏ௌ
𝑑𝑆௜
ఈఉ(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= −𝑆௜
ఈఉ(𝑡) + ෍ δ(𝑡 − 𝑡௝
ఉ)
{௧ೕ
ഁ}
 
Here 𝜏ௌ  is the synaptic time constant (assumed to be the same for all synapses) and 
the sum is over all spikes emitted at times 𝑡௝
ఉ < 𝑡.  
Decision-making and decision criterion: In response to the presentation of a stimulus, 
the activities of the U-selective and D-selective neurons change differently (Fig. 5d). 
We compute at all time points the population averaged activity of all the excitatory 
neurons which belong to the set 𝑎, (𝑎-selevtive), denoted by  𝜈௔  , 𝑎 ∈ {𝑈, 𝐷}, by 
convolving the spike times with an exponential filter with a time constant of 50 msec. 
Decision is based on the ratio:  ఔೆି ఔವ
ఔೆା ఔವ
. If  ఔೆି ఔವ
ఔೆା ఔವ
> 𝜙 , the decision provided by the 
network is that upper segment is longer than the lower one, whereas for  ఔವି ఔೆ
ఔವା ఔೆ
> 𝜙 it 
is the opposite, where 𝜙 > 0 is a parameter.  
It should be noted that the ability of the network to make a decision depends on the 
network parameters, in particular on 𝑔, which controls the relative strength of the 
competition between U and D neurons, the value chosen for the threshold 𝜙 as well 
as the parameters of the stimulus, 𝐼଴̅஑ and 𝐼ଵ̅ఈ. An extensive study of this issue is beyond 
the scope of the present paper. We have chosen all the parameters such that the 
network is always able to make decisions, including when ∆𝐿 = 0 
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Numerical integration: The dynamics of the model circuit were numerically integrated 
using the Euler method supplemented with an interpolation estimate of the spike 
times55. In all simulations the integration time step was 0.1 msec. We verified the 
validity of the results by performing complementary simulations with smaller time 
steps.  
Model parameters: The parameters used in all the simulations were: 𝑉௅ = −60mV; 
𝜏௠ = 10msec; 𝑉 = 10mV; 𝑉ோ = −60mV; 𝐽ாா = 35mV ∙ ms, 𝐽ூா = 233.3mV ∙ ms, 𝐽ாூ =
−175mV ∙ ms, 𝐽ூூ = −233.3mV ∙ ms, 𝐼௕ா = 840mV, 𝐼௕ூ  = 560mV, 𝐼଴୉ = 840mV, 𝐼଴୍ =
560mV,  𝐼ଵ୉ = 140mV, 𝐼ଵ୍ = 140mV, 𝜏ௌ = 3msec. The total number of neurons and 
average non-specific connectivity were  𝑁 = 40,000, 𝐾 = 400, 𝜙 = 0.4. 
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Figure S1 The motor task. (a) A detailed description of a single trial in the motor 
task. A trial began with a presentation of the two dots and a central black disk on a 
white disk background. After 750 msec, a cursor appeared on the central black disk 
and the participant used the mouse to place it over one of the dots. Then, the 
participant clicked on the dot and used the mouse to pull it to the central black disk 
and released it. An accurate release of the dot resulted in a 1.1 sec “swallowing” of 
the dot animation the dragging time (from click to release) was displayed 
(participants were instructed to minimize that time). Then, the cursor reappeared on 
the central black disk and the process repeated. (b) Locations and colors of all 10 
pairs of dots used in the experiment, with the corresponding distributions of choice 
biases. There was a consistent choice preference for the two pairs of dots denoted 
by asterisks and therefore they were not used in the analysis in Fig. 2b. 
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Figure S2 The distribution of coefficients of variation (CV) of the excitatory neurons 
in the spiking network model. The CV’s were computed over 100 sec of spontaneous 
activity.  
Data availability 
The data that support these findings are available from the corresponding author upon 
request. 
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